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CARRIERS.
The King's Bench, in Hohlvell Iron Co. v. Midland Railway, L. R. i K. B. (1909) 486, held that payment for railway
Rcbates Under services need not necessarily be in cash; and that
English Rull. an agreement with a railway which is fair and
way Acts
reasonable will not be upset merely because it
involves a rebate.
(For a full discussion see note p. 566 of this issue.)
CONTRACTS.
An agreement whereby A is to occupy space in a building,
for the mutual benefit of both parties, is rendered void by a
fire which destroys the building. (Einerich Outfitn, slbnllty
of ISrowac.

ting Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 86 N. E. x1o4,
Illinois.)

(For a full discussion see note p. 569 of this issue.)
A street railway company holding a franchise to build its
line on a city street mortgaged all its property, and thereafter entered into a contract with a railroad coint~abjt'Is ofpany, whereby it was agreed, in consequence of
AsSIgnees
the latter company's permission to cross its track,
which crossed the street at right angles, to bear the expense
of the construction and maintenance of the crossing. Later
the company's mortgage was foreclosed and appellant bought
it in at the sale. It was held in suit by one of the original
parties to the contract (appellee) against the assignee of the
other, that there was no privity of contract between the parties
and a purchaser of all the rights, franchise and property of the
street railway company at the foreclosure sale, and that therefore the purchaser was not liable on the contract. Evanszill & S. I. Co. v. Evansville Belt Rzvy. Co., 87 N. E. 21.
The obligations of a contract are ordinarily limited to the
parties by whom they are made, and those who stand in privity
with them either in estate or contract. Spencer's Case, i
Smith's Lead Cas. 8th Ed. 168; Webb v. Russell, 3 T. R. 393.
Privity of estate that can render parties liable upon contracts not of their own making relate solely to covenants run(575)
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ning with the land or some interest therein.

Keppel v. Bailey,

M. & K. 517. IHere there was no estate, title or interest
in any land to which the contract sued on related, and therefore no liability could attach to the appellant on this ground.
Privity of contract was also absent, since the appellants or
transferees got their title not by contract with, or transfer
from the street-car company, but by purchase of the same
at a sale thereof, made under a decree of foreclosure of a
mortgage thereon, antedating the contract sued on.
There was, therefore, neither privity of estate nor privity of
contract b,-ween the purchasers and the original parties to the
arrangements that would render the former liable thereon.
It does not appear from the circumstances of the case that
any work had been (lone by the purchasing company on the
crossing. An interesting question would have arisen in that
event as to how much work would constitute a practical assumption of the liabilities of the contract. As it is, the case
is one of a thousand.
2

CRIMINAL LAW.
Prisoner had had a quarrel with deceased; the latter went
away and in a short time returned to get his coat. Prisoner
was standing outside his own dwelling, and as deNecessity of
ceased advance lie shot him. Held (as dictum),
"Retreat to
a person no longer need flee from danger of perthe Wall"
sonal injury at the hand of another rather than strike him
down to avert it, if that danger is honest, the reasonable apprehension is of the grade mentioned, and such striking is so
apprehended to be necessary, and such danger is not produced
by such person's wrong. Miller v. State, 119 N. W. 85o,
Wis.
The doctrine of fleeing to the wall in self-defense is of long
standing, and is still a much mooted question. Blackstone, in
his Commentaries, states the necessity of flight where practicable in self-defense to be the only safe and just rule, (vol.
IV, p. I85), and it was for a long time considered settled law.
A conflict has since arisen, however, as to the justice of requiring a man to flee when attacked, and this conflict is nowhere better illustrated than in the Supreme Court of the
United States. In the case of Beard v. U. S., I58 U. S. 550
(1895), the Court expressly decided that one need not retreat
when he is in a place "where lie has a right to be," though the
conclusion is dictum, as in that case the prisoner was on his
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own grounds at the time of the shooting. In the case of
A.llen v. U. S., in 164 U. S. 492, decided one year later, Mr.
Justice Brown, in delivering the opinion of the Court, carefully limited the doctrine of Beard v. U. S. to the case where
the prisoner was on his own premises. Only a few pages
beyond in the same report Mr. Justice Harlan in delivering the
opinion in the case of Rowe v. U. S., 164 U. S. 546 (1896),
expressly applies the dictum in Beard v. U. S. to the facts of
the case before him, and dispenses with the necessity of retreat
where both parties were in a hotel. The Belgian courts have
made an interesting distinction, and do not require retreat in
the case of "soldiers or gentlemen." (Pandectes Belges, Vol.
16, p. 802.) Pennsylvania has followed the old doctrine requiring retreat (Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9), and at
the present time this still appears to be supported by the
weight of authority. 16 H. L. R., p. 567.
On appeal from a conviction for murder, the following
charge of the trial court was sustained as correct: "If a man
picks a quarrel with his fellow and kills his felHomicide:
Provocatioa:
low, the law denies him the plea of self-defense.
Self-Defense
If the defendant used language toward the deceased that a reasonable man would expect to bring on a fight,
then the law denies him the plea of self-defense." State v.
Hunter, 63 S. E. (S. C.) 685.
There is some authority for this doctrine, (State Y. Rowell,
75 S. C. 51o; Baldwin v. State, iII Ala. Ii), but an examination of its results will prove it both unsound and unjust. In Smith v. State, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 4o2, its fallacy was pointed out by the following reasoning. It is
universally held that no words can amount to an assault.
Therefore when one person assaults another as a result of opprobrious words spoken by the latter, the assailant is the first
aggressor in the eye of the law. And yet under the doctrine of
the principal case, if the assaulted party engage in the fight,
lie is guilty of assault and battery.
So also in State v. Suller, 82 Mo. 623, the doctrine of the
principal case was shown to lead to the following ridiculous
result: A party beginning an altercation is defenseless before
a resulting assault or a murder if he successfully resist it.
It is universally held that one who assaults another Will,
nevertheless, have the right of self-defense if. the assault is
repellcd by an unreasonably excessive amount of force; and,
yet, tinder the doctrine under discussion, a person who used
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opprobrious language to another would not have the right of
self-defense no matter what amount of force was used in
return.
The same criticism applies to a doctrine denying the plea of
self-defense to one who by words provokes an assault for the
purpose of chastising his assailant as was held in Gibson v.
State, 89 Ala. 121.
The best rule and the one most generally recognized is that
the right of self-defense is denied only to him who provokes
a difficulty with the intent to kill or do great bodily harm.
State v. Cller, supra, Bennett v. State, ioo Ind. 171; Matthews v. State, ioo Tex. Cr. R. 3r.
EQUITY.
A written contract was entered into between one Urdangen
and the defendants, by which the latter agreed to trade certain
tracts of land for a stock of goods. The name
SeIfic Per- that Urdangen signed was "New York Brokerage
P,.udulert
Co.," but defendants believed that Urdangen was
doing business tinder that name and Urdangen
Reprezcta.
tions
represented that he was the owner of the goods
in question. In fact the contract was made by Urdangen on
behalf of the New York Brokerage Co., which subsequently
sought to obtain specific perfomlance of the contract. In refusing the relief sought the Court put its decision on the
ground. among others, that the false representations of Urdangen induced defendants to believe that they were doing
business with Urdangen, and that he was the owner of the
goods. "It is the right of a party," said the Court, "to know
with whom he deals, unless he consents to deal with an agent
on behalf of an undisclosed principal." New York Brokerage Co. v. Wharton, ii 9 N. W. (Iowa) 969.
This is an example of a well-recognized class of cases, in
which specific performance is refused on the ground that there
were fraudulent representations as to the identity of the adversary party. For the purpose of defeating the extraordinary
remedy of specific performance, such fraudulent representations appear always to be considered material (Ellsworth v.
Randall. 78 Ia. 14), although at law such misrepresentations
constitute a valid defense only when the identity of the party
is an essential element of the contract. I Page on Contracts,

§ 62.
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EQUITY (Continued).
It is not clear from the opinion whether the court denied
the right of an undisclosed principal to obtain specific performance of a contract made by his agent or not. In the
extract quoted above such a case seems to be expressly excepted from the principle laid down, but at the close of the
same paragraph of the opinion it is strongly intimated that
an undisclosed principal would not be granted this remedy.
The question has never come up, except, as in the principal
case, in connection with fraud, sufficient, of itself, to bar the
remedy.
EVIDENCE.
Plaintiffs, claiming as heirs and administrators of X, deceased, averring mental incompetency on the part of X, brought
ons: suit to rescind a contract entered into between
tes
p
Laws oFther X and defendant in the purchase of X's reversionary interest under the will of Y, deceased. Defendant pleaded a judgment in another state (New York)
brought by the executors of the will Y against X and the
present defendant. It was proved that X had died before
judgment in the case had been rendered, and the question was
whether the judgment in New York estopped plaintiffs at
bar, claiming under X as against defendant, who was a codefendant in that action. The statutes of the home state
(Wisconsin) ruled that such a judgment would not have
affected the deceased or his interest in the subject of action.
The court had evidence that the statutes of New York were
of similar import, but said that in any case they were authorized to presume that the same statutes existed in New York
Mochleupah v. Mayhew, Ti9 N. W. 827.
Where a foreign rule controls, it must be proved like any
other factun probandiom. NVigmore Evidence § 2536. In these
cases, in order to facilitate matters, certain presumptions are
resorted to. If it is the law of a state possessing the English
Common Law as the foundation of its system-in particular,
one of the United States-it is then presumed that that law is
the same as the law of the former. Pattillo v. Alexander, 96
Ga. 6o; Houghtalinq v. Ball, i9 Mo. 84. Some courts, inchiding those of Wisconsin, as shown by the case in hand,
extend this rule even to cases involving the existence of statutory enactments (Cavallero v. R. R., 42 Pac. 918), but a large
number of others draw the distinction here and confine the
presumption to the common or judicially declared law. This
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latter distinction, which appears at first sight somewhat illogical, was drawn in a recent Virginia case (Mountain Land Co.
v. Blair, 63 S. E. 751), in which the statutes of a sister state
were not recognized by presumption. The jurisdictions seemed
almost equally devided on the question.
Defendant, through its agent, obtained a right of way over
plaintiff's land, by assuring her, first, that no damage would
land, and secondly,
be done to thelehe
bjce that it was of
Trespass
no moment whether plaintiff objected or not, since
Pau
defendant had the privilege of coming on the land
in any event by governmental sanction. Both of these representations were absolutely false, but plaintiff, who was an
ignorant woman, was thereby induced to sign a contract permitting the passage of wires over her plantation. Defendants
entered, cut down many trees, and plaintiff sues in trespass.
It was held that since the grant was obtained by fraud, or
was no grant at all, that defendant therefore came in without
permission, and was liable as a trespasser for damages. Brown
v. Ant. Tel. Co., 63 S. E. 744.
This is severe but safe law. Defendant knew it was making
false representations to plaintiff and obtained permission to
enter the land by fraud. Whatever rights it had, it acquired
solely by the fraud it practiced on plaintiff. It had no right
to profit by its fraud; it had no right to rely on the consent
of the owner of the property to its entering as a business invitee, when it had obtained that consent merely by gross misrepresentations. Accordingly, there was not that meeting of
the minds essential to a valid contract. Defendant was in no
better position than a trespasser.
This principle has been affirmed in other jurisdictions, and
is chiefly met with in cases of passengers suing for injuries
received while riding on a ticket or pass got by a fraud from
the defendant railroad company. Toledo, Wabash & Westert R. R. Co. v. Beggs, 85 Ill. 8o; Way v. Chicago, Rock Island
& Pacific Rzwy. Co., 64 Iowa, 48. Perhaps the nearest case
was that of Fitz-nauricev. N. Y., IV. H. & H. R. R., 192 Mass.
i59, decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 19o6,
wherein a girl who had falsely represented to the company
that she was a school girl under eighteen years of age and
thereby got a special-rate ticket, was injured in a railway collision and was prevented from recovering because the license
was obtained by fraud.
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LIBEL AND SLANDER.
Defendant's newspaper published an article accusing the
prosecutor, who was county treasurer, of "illegally filching
perCriminal Lia- money," etc. The defendant was not aware
bilityforCrlti, sonally of the publication of the article. Held, the
cisin of Public article exceeded public privilege, the word "filch"
Officers
imputed a crime, and for truth to be a defense
under the statute, it must be published with good motives.
People v. Fuller, 87 N. E. 336 (Ill.).
NVhile privileged discussion of public officers presents questions not free from difficulty, in this case the privilege was so
clearly exceeded that the court had no trouble in dismissing
that defense on the authority of Rearick v. Wilson, 81 Ill. 77.
The only other defense seriously offered was that of truth, but
it appeared that not only were the statements not strictly true,
but that the good motive required by statute was supplanted by
malice.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
In the case of Keithley v. Stevens, 87 N. E. Rep. 375, action
was brought for the malicious abuse of process. The evidence
offered by the plaintiff was to the effect that deIns
C5IuSuit of fendant had maliciously instituted a suit for his
disbarment, and by bribing witnesses had caused
the judgment to go against plaintiff. There was no proof that
when the process against the plaintiff was once issued, it was
improperly issued; it was merely improperly caused to be issued. There was no seizure of the person or goods of the
plaintiff.
Held, malicious institution of civil suits does not constitute a
malicious abuse of process, as the action lies for an improper
use of process after it has been issued, and not for maliciously
causing it to be issued.
The essential elements of an action for malicious abuse of
process are clearly laid down in the case of Bonney v. King,
201 Ill. 47. There must be first, the existence of an ulterior
purpose; and, second, an action in the use of the process not
proper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding.
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NEGLIGENCE.
Plaintiff's infant son was killed by the fall of a lumber pile
in defendant's lumber yard, while watching some other boys
fly a kite. There was evidence that the pile was
Affirmative
in a dangerous condition, and that the deceased
Obligations
Toward Tres- and his companions had not always been forbidRecovery was
Ltrlneofthe den to play in the lumber yard.
" Turn-Table
aast.,
denied on the ground that deceased was a trespasser, and that the pile was not a dangerous instrumentality likely to attract children. Kelly v. Bcvas, 116
S. XV. (Mo.) 557.
The general rule with regard to the duty of a landowner
toward trespassers is that he is liable only for an act of commission, done with reference to the trespassers presence, likely
to cause injury and causing such injury. Palner v. Gordon,
173 Mass. 40.
There is a widely recognized exception to this rule (which,
however, is not in force in Pennsylvania, New York, New
Jersey or Massachusetts), to the effect that a real estate owner
is liable for injury to infant trespassers, when it results from
an artificial condition created on the premises, dangerous
through the omission of some precaution compatible with the
use thereof, and of such a nature and so situated as to hold
out a constructive invitation to children. Edgington v. Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern Ry. Co., z16 Ia. 410. In
the principal case the court states the necessity of maintaining the present narrow limits of so extreme a doctrine, and
wisely holds a lumber pile not to be such an instrumentality
as to constitute a trap for children.

SALES.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Waters-Pierce
Oil Co. v. Beselis, 29 Supreme Court Rep. 270, held, that
where B sold coal oil to A and A resold to X,
gerous Article who was injured by an explosion caused by gasoline in the coal oil. B was liable therefor.
(For a full discussion of the principles involved see note, p.
563 of this issue.)
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Morgan v. Russell & Sons, i K. B. D. (Part III) (19o9)
357. The plaintiff and defendants entered into an agreement
whereby the defendants agreed to sell certain slag
Ileaningof
on a piece of land to the plaintiff and to give him
the Term
"Goods"
the right to enter upon the land and take away as
much slag as he wanted, paying 2S. 3d. a ton therefor. The
slag in question had been tipped upon the land a long time before and had become a part of the soil. After the plaintiff
had removed several tons the defendants refused to allow them
to take any more. The question to be determined was whether
the slag was within the term "Goods" as defined by the Sale of
Goods Act of 1893, Sec. 62, so as to allow the plaintiff to
recover as damages the difference between the contract price and
the market price, as provided by Section 51 of the same act.
Held, that the agreement was not within Sec. 62 of Sale of
Goods Act, 1893. The contract was not for the sale of any
separate thing, but appears to be exactly analogous to a contract which gives a man a right to enter upn the land with
liberty to dig from the earth in situ so much gravel, earth or
coal on payment of a price per ton.
Sec. 62 of Sale of Goods Act is as follows: "'Goods' includes
all chattels personal other than things in action and money.
* * * The term includes emblements, industrial growing
crops and things attached to or forming part of the land, which
are agreed to be severed before or under the contract of sale."
The words "attached to and forming part of the land" appear
to apply to things such as emblements and crops and do not
apply to anything that is a part of the land, as a gravel bed
or a section of the earth itself.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
A promise by A to give B certain property if B would support A and his wife during the remainder of their lives was
possesslon &0 taken out of the Statute of Frauds by possession
Part Perform- and performance by B. Taylor v. Taylor, 99 Pac.
ance
814 (Kansas).
(For a full discussion of the principle involved, see note, p.
573 of this issue.)
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TRUSTS.
One Lever transferred to trustees her deposits in certain
savings banks in trust for her-,elf for life, and after her death,
upon several other trusts. She reserved an express
Creation of
Trusts Testa- power of revocation, and also the right to demand
of the trustee at any time any sum of money not
mentary to
Character
in excess of the balance of the trust money then
in the hands of the trustee. feld, though the reservation of
the power of revocation did not of itself render the trust invalid, yet during her life the property was at her absolute disposal, and all the trustee had to do was to collect and hold the
property; hence the only material effect of the instrument was
testamentary and could not be enforced on account of the
statute requiring a duly executed will. McEvoy v. Boston
Savings Bank, 87 N. E. 465 (Mass.).
It is almost universally agreed that the mere reservation of
a power of revocation does not invalidate an otherwise validly
created trust (Cent. Dig., Vol. 47, § 8o), and the case becomes,
therefore, chiefly interesting as determining what state of facts
presents such a complete retention of control by the settlor as
to amount to a nullification of the trust for all practical purposes. It had been decided by the same court a short time before that reception of the income during life, coupled with the
retention of the power to alter the post mortem disposition of
the property constituted a validly created trust (Kelley v. Snow,
7o N. E. 89); but that case was distinguished by saying that
there the settlor could not affect the amount of the property to
be disposed of, but only its disposition, while here the testatrix
could change the entire trust at any time, so that during the life
of the testatrix the trust was a mere cloak for a testamentary
disposition. The question as to whether or not there had been a
sufficient legal transfer of the trust property (savings bank
deposits) was not discussed, though in view of the analogy
between savings bank books and stock certificates the question
might have presented an interesting point, as it does not appear
that the bank book itself was turned over.

